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Stimulating Fear Reduction: 
Visual Stimulus, Verbal and 
Spatial Concentration and Their 
Effects on Fear 
Studies have suggested that visual stimuli evoking 
positive emotions may counter the effects of 
negative emotions. A high level of involvement in a 
distracting task may reduce the severity of negative 
emotions. This study combined visual stimuli with 
level of mental involvement to determine if they 
had an effect on fear. It was posited that two types 
of visual stimuli—amusing and spatial—would lower 
fear, and a high level of involvement with each 
stimulus would enhance this effect. The stimuli were 
delivered over the Internet. Fear level was measured 
using the self-report for the word "afraid" from 
PANAS. A significant interaction between type of 
stimulus and level of involvement was found, p = 
.05. The results may indicate that spatial 
concentration without mental verbalization 
decreases fear level. Viewing amusing stimulus may 
also reduce fear, but this may only be true when it is 
viewed passively. The effect of fear reduction may 
be reduced when the person elaborates about the 
amusing stimulus using language. 
Gregory E. Dixson 
University of Wisconsin- 
Madison 
A chimpanzee sits high in the forest canopy 
when he hears the crack of a branch breaking 
nearby. He looks over to see another male chimp, 
from a neighboring population, charging with hair 
on end. The first chimp's eyebrows furrow, and 
his mouth purses in anger. He gets up to fight 
and realizes that five adult males accompany his 
challenger. He grimaces and screams, drops his 
dinner and jumps 10 meters to the ground below. 
He scrambles into the brush, barely escaping with 
his life. 
Negative emotions such as anger and fear are 
activating. They cause us to take action, such as 
fight or flee. We do not have to consider whether 
to run when we are frightened. The fear emotion 
moves us to react. There was evolutionary benefit  
for our ancestors to have built-in responses, 
triggered by emotion (Tomkins, 1991). Each 
emotion has distinct motivational properties and 
serves adaptive functions (Abe a Izard, 1999a). 
Many of the negative emotions are activating and 
drive us to take one of just a few actions. A 
number of positive emotions may be deactivating 
and serve to broaden our choices for how to 
respond (Fredrickson, 1998). The potentially 
deactivating properties of positive emotions, 
coupled with the automatic emotional response 
to external stimuli, has lead researchers to 
investigate the possibility that certain positive 
emotions can be triggered in order to undo the 
effects of negative emotions. Fredrickson and 
Levenson (1998) suggested positive emotions of 
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contentment and amusement act to return the 
individual to a relaxed condition after the readied 
state of a negative emotion, and in an experiment 
they showed that self-reported and physiological 
changes, which occurred after viewing fear 
evoking stimulus, could be countered with 
amusing stimulus. 
However, some of their data was inconsistent 
with earlier research. Ekman, Levenson and 
Friesen (1983) found that fear increases heart 
rate. In the Fredrickson and Levenson study 
(1998), the stimulus that was intended to provoke 
fear lowered heart rate. Their first stimulus may 
have only provoked interest, which is generally 
considered a positive emotion, unrelated to fear 
(Fredrickson, 1998). Because of this problem, it 
is important to test their idea that amusement 
can counter fear by using a different methodology. 
Researchers have theorized that rumination 
tends to increase negative emotions and prolong 
their effects, whereas distracting involvement has 
the opposite effect (Lyubomirski, Caldwell, a 
Noten-Hoeksema, 1998; Rusting Et Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998). Lyubomirski, Caldwell and 
Nolen-Hoeksema defined ruminating response as 
"thinking about how sad, apathetic, and tired one 
feels...wondering about the causes of one's 
depressive symptoms...and worrying about their 
implications" (Lyubomirski et al., p. 166). The 
researchers found that rumination caused 
depressed participants to have more negative 
affect, and involvement with a distracting task 
lead depressed participants to have less negative 
affect. Neither response style had an effect on 
those without depression—their negative affect 
level did not change. 
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) have 
proposed that the effect of involved or distracted 
versus ruminating response style can be 
broadened to include other negative emotions, 
and they tested that theory on anger. According 
to the associative-network approach, the pattern 
of effects that rumination and involvement have 
on anger should be similar to their impact on 
depressed mood—rumination should increase 
anger, and involvement with a distracting task 
should decrease anger. To induce a state of 
involvement they used a story completion task, 
where they would start a sentence such as, "An 
older person is talking to a younger person," and 
then the participant had 5 minutes to write the 
end of the story (Rusting a Nolen-Hoeksema, 
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1998). They found that while rumination did 
increase anger, involvement had little effect. 
Henriques and Davidson (1997) found 
selective impairment of spatial, compared with 
verbal, tasks in depressed participants, perhaps 
supporting the idea that spatial areas of the brain 
underfunction in those with depression when 
compared with verbal regions. The associative 
networks theory states that different negative 
emotions may be related, and there is precedent 
for testing whether a response related to one 
negative emotion has an effect on another 
negative emotion (Rusting a Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998). So in this experiment the researcher 
combined these two ideas, and spatial stimulation 
was tested to see if it had an effect on fear. 
There are several limitations in past 
experiments that the current research addresses. 
Fredrickson and Levenson (1998) may not have 
adequately demonstrated that they had truly 
elicited fear, and so their assertion that 
amusement counters fear is in doubt. Second, 
the effect of involvement has not been tested on 
fear, but it has been shown to have an effect on 
depression (Lyubomirski, Caldwell, Et Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998). Finally, spatial abilities may 
be related to depression (Henriques EC Davidson, 
1997), but spatial stimulation has not been tested 
on fear. There is evidence that when something 
effects one negative emotion, it may have a 
similar effect on other negative emotions (Rusting 
a Nolen-Hoeksema). Involvement has not been 
paired with different types of stimuli to see if 
they interact to have an effect on fear—it could 
be that involvement enhances stimuli. Perhaps 
the puppy film was very distracting in Fredrickson 
Et Levenson (1998), and the other films were dull 
and allowed participants to ruminate. So it could 
be that involvement is a confounding variable, 
or perhaps involvement with stimuli causes an 
enhanced effect. For those reasons the current 
experiment was designed to examine the effects 
of stimuli and involvement on fear. 
The hypothesis tested was that both amusing 
stimuli and spatial stimuli would lower fear levels 
in participants. It was further predicted that level 
of involvement would interact with stimuli to 
create an enhanced effect in lowering fear even 
further. To test these hypotheses, participants 
were exposed to either amusing, spatial or control 
stimulus on a computer screen through an Internet 
browser. They were given instructions that 
created either a low or high level of involvement 
with the stimuli. Then their fear level was 
determined by administering the complete 
positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) and 
analyzing their response for the word "afraid." 
In this way, the level reported for the scale item 
of "afraid" was used to operationalize the 
emotion of fear. 
METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred three people in the USA and 
Japan participated. Data were analyzed for the 
94 people that completed all scale items-57 
women and 37 men between the ages of 19 and 
75, M = 36.32, SD = 12.73. This sample included 
87 Caucasians, 2 Asians and 5 people who did not 
list their ethnicity. The participants took part in 
the experiment individually and were unpaid 
volunteers. They were treated in accordance with 
ethical principals for experimental psychology 
involving human participants and gave informed 
consent. 
Design 
A 3 x 2 factorial experiment was used. The 
first factor was stimulus: a) control/no 
stimulation—participants viewed a blank 
computer screen, b) amusing stimulus—
participants viewed a photograph of several goats 
standing in and next to a road, one of them 
kneeling in the grass looking at or eating 
something, and c) spatial stimulus—participants 
viewed a patterns of dots in colors and patterns 
that were similar to those in the amusing level, 
but the shapes were not obviously animals. 
The second factor was involvement: a) low—
participants were not instructed what to think 
about when viewing the stimulus, and b) high—
participants were instructed to make up a story 
if they were in the control level of stimulus, to 
make up a story about the goats if they were in 
the amusing stimulus level and to picture the 
objects that the dots represented in the spatial 
level. This way of operationalizing involvement 
is similar to Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema's 
experiment (1998), where participants in the high 
involvement level were asked to make up a story 
that finished a partial sentence that they were 
given. The dependent variable was fear, measured 
using a self-report for the word "afraid" mixed 
in with the 19 other words from PANAS (Watson, 
Clark, Et Tellegan, 1988). 	
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A main effect of stimulus was predicted, such 
that the participants in the amusing and spatial 
levels would have lower fear compared with 
participants in the control level. An interaction 
was predicted between stimulus and involvement 
such that there would be a greater reduction of 
fear in participants when stimuli were paired with 
high involvement. The amusing and spatial levels 
of stimulus were compared with the control in 
an analysis of variance test (ANOVA). The control 
served as a baseline level of fear, the amount of 
experienced by people without any manipulation. 
Many studies of emotion use stimulus to invoke 
an emotion. The current study differed in this 
respect and looked at changes in baseline 
emotional states. 
Materials 
A software program was designed to 
administer the treatments and the PANAS test 
over the Internet. A male experimenter 
programmed the study to run on an Internet 
server, accessed by participants with a web 
browser. The program was written in Visual Basic 
6.0, running under Internet Information Server 
4.0 on a Windows NT web server, with data 
collected in SQL Server 6.5 (Microsoft 
Corporation, Redmond, Washington) and analyzed 
in SPSS 10.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). 
Procedure 
An e-mail was sent to potential participants, 
and they took part in the study by clicking on a 
link in the e-mail. This launched an Internet 
browser that then ran the experimental program. 
Participants read a description of the study and 
gave informed consent. The program assigned 
participants to conditions randomly, with both 
participants and the experimenter blind to 
experimental conditions. 
A different screen image was presented for 
each of the three stimulus levels: a) the control/ 
no stimulus level had a black screen, b) the 
amusing level had a photograph of goats, and c) 
the spatial level had patterns of dots that were 
the same color and general pattern as the goats, 
but were sparse and not obviously animals. In 
the low level of involvement, participants were 
given little instruction. In the high involvement 
level, participants were instructed to make up a 
story. In the spatial image, high involvement 
condition the instructions were modified to 
encourage spatial thoughts (and discourage verbal 
ones) in order not to confound the spatial 
stimulation. The instructions in this case were to 
look for patterns in the dots without using 
language and compare sizes of shapes that the 
patterns formed, dismissing any verbalization that 
came to mind by thinking "that's language" and 
then going back to the spatial task comparing sizes 
without using words. 
The stimuli were delivered for sixty seconds. 
The entire PANAS test (Watson et al., 1988) was 
then administered using the question prefix for 
current affect, specifying that the participant 
should rate their feelings for that moment in time 
(Watson et al., 1988). 
RESULTS 
A two-way, between-subjects ANOVA was used 
to test the predictions that both amusing and 
spatial stimuli would tower fear, and involvement 
would have an enhancing effect to lower fear to 
a high degree. There were no significant main 
effects, but an interaction was found between 
stimulus and involvement, F(2, 88) = 3.21, p = 
.05 (Figure 1). 
While there was a significant interaction 
between stimulus and involvement, an LSD 
planned comparison found no significant 
differences between fear levels in any of the 
conditions; so this analysis will discuss the 
direction of the differences suggested by the 
interaction with the qualification that there were 
no significant simple main effects. The hypothesis 
was that both an amusing photograph and spatial 
image would lower fear, and that high 
involvement in a task related to the image would 
reduce fear even more. Contrary to those 
predictions fear was slightly higher in the involved 
levels for both the amusing stimulus and the 
control stimulus. But in the direction 
corresponding to predictions, fear was lower 
when high involvement was combined with the 
spatial stimulus when compared to low 
involvement with the spatial stimulus (Figure 1). 
Participants rated their fear level by 
responding on a 1 to 5 scale for the word "Afraid," 
with 1 signifying very little fear and 5, extreme 
fear. In the control stimulus (black screen) with 
low involvement (no task) condition, participants 
averaged a low fear level, M = 1.14, SD = 0.36. 
With control stimulus and high involvement (make 
up a story), participants averaged a slightly higher 
level of fear, M = 1.40, SD = 0.91. In the amusing  
stimulus (comical photograph) with low 
involvement (no task) condition, all participants 
indicated the lowest level of fear possible on the 
scale, and there was no variance whatever, with 
M = 1.00, SD = 0.00. In the amusing stimulus with 
high involvement (make up a story) condition, 
participants averaged a higher fear level, M = 
1.25, SD = 0.77. Exposed to spatial stimulus 
(patterns of dots) with low involvement (no task), 
participants had a higher fear level, M = 1.41, SD 
= 0.80, when compared to participants who 
viewed spatial stimulus with high involvement 
(mentally compare pattern sizes and imagine 
what the patterns look like without using 
language), M = 1.00, SD = 0.00. Note that this 
final condition had the lowest level of fear and 
no variance, with all participants reporting the 
lowest fear level possible, similar to the amusing 
stimulus with low involvement condition. 
It is counterintuitive that being involved in 
an amusing task would produce fear, and perhaps 
something else is going on besides involvement. 
To involve participants with the amusing and 
control stimuli, they were instructed to make up 
a story. In the involved level of the spatial 
stimulus, they were asked to mentally imagine 
what the patterns of dots represented without 
using language, and if language came into their 
heads they should label it mentally by saying, 
"That's language," and then go back to a strictly 
spatial task. Could it be that activating the 
language centers of the cerebral cortex increases 
fear, where activating the spatial areas decreases 
it? 
That interpretation would be consistent with 
the pattern of the interaction. It could also be 
that spatial stimulation has nothing to do with 
the results all, and that simply removing 
language-based concentration lowered fear. The 
instructions for the high involvement level of the 
spatial stimulus were somewhat meditative, and 
perhaps that type of meditation lowers fear. 
DISCUSSION 
A key problem is that if language 
concentration increases fear and meditative, 
spatial concentration lowers fear, those are not 
two ends of the same measure. They should be 
viewed as entirely separate variables. That calls 
into question the interaction in this experiment. 
Fixing this problem would not be as easy as adding 
a third factor. While spatial and language 
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FIGURE ONE  
Interaction of visual stimulus and involvement level. 
n Low Involvement 
n High Involvement 
Interaction of visual stimulus and involvement level. High involvement with language elaboration 
had higher fear level in both the control and amusing stimulus conditions compared to the 
conditions without language elaboration. However high involvement with spatial concentration 
had the opposite pattern—lower fear with the high involvement task. Note that the interaction 
was significant while the simple main effects were not. 
concentration may not be opposite sides of the 
same coin, they cannot exist simultaneously 
either. A participant cannot concentrate using 
language and spatially, without language, at the 
same time. If they are to be treated as separate 
variables they may have to be tested individually. 
The distribution of fear scores, representing 
participants' self-report ratings for the word 
"afraid" from the PANAS affect scale, had a strong 
positive skew (Figure 2). It could be that most 
people have absolutely no fear at baseline. If that 
is true then this experimental design may be 
incapable of detecting a result—fear could not 
be reduced unless it was first induced. It could 
also be that a broader range of possible responses 
would shift the mean to the right, e.g. if the 
response for "afraid" was rated on a scale with a 
greater range of options, then perhaps average 
participants would report a 2 or 3 at baseline, 
instead of almost everyone reporting the lowest 
category, as happened in this study. A wider scale 
might spread out the distribution, which would 
reduce the floor effect. 
A variety of other methods have been used 
to measure emotions such as fear, and it has been 
suggested that the best studies of emotion use 
multiple measures (Davidson et al., 1999; 
Fredrickson Et Levenson, 1998). Facial expressions 
have been used as an indicator of type of affect 
experienced by participants in some studies 
(Ekman, 1997). Other researchers have 
determined that facial expressions can indicate 
the level or intensity of an emotion (Abe Et Izard, 
1999b). Additionally, measurements of the 
autonomic nervous system, such as heart rate and 
skin conductivity, may help to differentiate 
emotions (Ekman et al., 1983), although 
researchers have questioned whether these 
measures can be used to determine whether a 
specific emotion is being experienced by a given 
person (See Davidson, Jackson Et Kalin, 2000 for 
a discussion). 
Much of the prior research that formed the 
basis for this experiment concerned depression 
rather than fear, partly because a great deal of 
the neurological study of emotion concerns 
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FIGURE TWO  













   




Distribution of fear level scores for participants in all research conditions. A fear level of 1 would 
signify very little fear and 5, extreme fear. Frequency is number of participants who had that fear 
level. The floor effect may cause problems in drawing conclusions from the data. 
depression. Fear is not depression, although they 
may be related (Lonigan, Hooe, David, Et Kistner, 
1999). The literature provides good support for 
testing spatial activation in relation to negative 
affect (Henriques a Davidson, 1997), and studies 
support the premise that involvement with a task 
may counteract rumination by distracting 
participants from their negative thoughts, and 
this may lessen depressed affect (Lyubomirsky 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). There is less support for 
testing involvement and spatial stimulation on 
fear, but the interaction demonstrated in this 
study supports the idea that spatial stimulus may 
have an effect on fear when combined with 
involvement. This may distract a person from 
fearful thoughts in a manner analogous to the 
relief from ruminating thoughts found in 
experiments of depressed affect (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, a Fredrickson, 1993). An 
important question for further research would be 
whether it is involvement with a spatial task that 
rreduces fear or if it is actually the removal of 
language-based reduces fear or if it is actually 
the removal of language-based concentration, 
instead. In order to test this, researchers could 
involve participants in a procedure that avoids 
language elaboration but does not involve a 6  
spatially stimulating task. 
A future study might incorporate multiple 
measures of A A future study might incorporate 
multiple measures of both fear and amusement 
in counteracting each other and in measuring 
changes in the relative strength of each emotion 
throughout the experiment. Facial expressions 
could be used to detect emotional changes. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
been used by researchers to measure activation 
in the amygdala, an area of the brain that has 
been shown to be stimulated by fear (See 
Davidson, 2000 for a discussion). Either facial 
expressions or fMRI would provide verification of 
the self-reported level of fear. 
In this study, researchers attempted to 
stimulate the spatial centers of the cerebral 
cortex. There are other ways to selectively 
stimulate the hemispheres of the brain than using 
verbal versus spatial stimulus. Vallar, Papagno, 
Rusconi, and Bisiach (1995) reported a procedure 
of putting warm water in one ear and cold water 
in the other. They demonstrated that this 
selectively activates one hemisphere. By putting 
cold water in the left ear and warm water in the 
right ear of participants, they selectively 
activated the spatial hemisphere. They reported 
that doing the reverse activated the verbal 
hemisphere. It would be interesting to determine 
if this stimulation is effective for the regions that 
have been shown to be less active in people with 
depression (Henriques Et Davidson, 1997). 
However, the hot and cold water technique may 
be too broadly activating. Viewing the brain as 
being two halves, the spatial and the verbal, is a 
gross simplification, and physiological measures 
would have to be made to determine if spatial 
and verbal centers are actually being selectively 
activated. 
Affect can predict life success (Lubin, Fiedler, 
Et Van-Whitlock, 1999), and so it is important to 
study its components. Disorders related to 
negative affect such as depression and those 
related to fear—phobias, panic and anxiety 
disorders—damage many people's quality of life. 
It may be possible to stimulate and train the brain 
to alleviate symptoms or even cure them. This 
will help us to understand the inner workings of 
the brain and the operation of the mind, and it 
has the potential to improve many lives. 
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